Gilgit Scouts and the history of FREEDOM

SECRET FILE - BRTISH ARCHIVES, BBC READS

Gilgit Scouts can be identified with part time force recruited through the local rulers from the Agency populations considered friendly, loyal and reliable by the British officials of the agency as Levis in 1889. The force was established as a regular entity by the British officials in Gilgit Agency when the Gilgit Wazarat (SAT-MAQSU) came in the direct control of British Political Agent after lease in 1935 towards administration, security within the Agency and the borders against threats from Russia. “A carefully chosen force capable of rapid movement in the mountainous territory controlled by British officers, the Gilgit Scouts, provided the muscle to the administration.” This force played a key role in fighting the war of liberation against Dogra / Indian Forces operating in the region in 1947/1948 and won independence for the people of Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan).

EVENTS: 01 Aug to 16th Nov 1947, GILGIT REBELLION; SOURCE FOR DOWNLOAD, Gilgit Rebellion

 List of Martyres Gilgit Scouts 1947-48

Exploits of Gilgit Scouts - War of Liberation 1948

The loyalty of local rulers to the British can be witnessed in the rare video I shared recently through my wall.

Future of Gilgit Agency - Discussions within British Indian echelons.

Official history of liberation: Ian Stephens - the man made responsible by President Ayub Khan to compile the official history of Pakistan - describes the relevant history as follows:
“This was not locally liked, but it was tolerated in the belief that, as Kashmir was a Muslim majority state, the Maharajah, despite his personal will, would soon act along the lines of Lord Mountbatton’s advice to the Princes generally in July, and accede to Pakistan. When the startling news came on 26 October of the Maharajah’s accession of Kashmir to India, the locals of Gilgit were outraged and so were the Muslim officers posted to Gilgit scouts and a few to the Maharajah’s army located at Bunji. Mullahs in the villages started preaching ‘JEHAD’ against the Dogra regime. Reports came that the neighboring Princely states of Swat and Chitral, which had joined Pakistan, were about to invade; Muslim soldier in the predominantly Sikh garrison at Bunji, on the far side of Indus, caused a disturbance; on the other hand, local Sikh and Hindu traders in Gilgit Bazaar were known to have arms. By the evening of 31 October, tension locally became such that, in the scout commandant’s view mutiny and slaughter, resulting in general chaos, could only be forestalled by prompt acceptance of what unquestionably was the prevailing popular will. He therefore sent a platoon to request the Hindu Governor to come to the Scout’s lines for protection and simultaneously ordered his colleague (Captain Matheson) detachments from Chilas (headed by Subedar Sher Ali of Yasin), as well as those from Gilgit (headed by Subedar Safiullah Beg) to hold the Indus River Crossings and prevent 6th Kashmir Infantry troops from Bunji getting over to Gilgit and undo the coup.
Some casualties ensued at the crossings and indeed on the Gilgit Residency’s moonlit lawns too, because the governor resisted custody and fired on the scouts and their sympathizers from his windows, killing one soldier from Hunza. But within a few hours, the affair was effectively over; and on 2nd November the Pakistan Flag was run up amidst public acclaims”.

The Mirs and the Governors of the Political Districts exercised their option to accede to Pakistan [obviously in consonance with the wishes of the populations]  their territories and communicated the same either in writing or verbally to Major William Brown, Commandant GILGIT SCOUTS - obvious authority in Gilgit at that time - who in turn communicated it through wireless messages to Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Prime Minister [CM] NWFP Peshawar as well as Col Bacon PA Khyber [the last British Political Agent in Gilgit] with an additional request to post a Pakistan Government Political Agent expeditiously. 

Quaid-e-Azam accepted the accession and asked the Prime Minister to issue "a simplified Instrument of Accession" on the 6th of November 1947 - see MOST IMMEDIATE minute no 380-G initiated by Liagat Ali Khan. 

Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan as well as Mir of Nagar, Shaukat Ali Khan, signed this instrument on 19th November 1947. The Governor-General of Pakistan M. Ali Jinnah endorsed this ‘instrument of accession’ on 7 December 1947.

Further parleys with the delegations from the region in 1950 resulted in continuation of the administrative structure of an Agency which continued till 1974. Ever since different options have been instituted by GOP.

Hunza Delegation in Kashmir that was also invited for parleys with GOP in 1950.

On 29 August 2009 the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan announced the creation of Gilgit–Baltistan, a new province-like autonomous region with Gilgit city as its capital and Skardu as the largest city. A sizable number of young generation activists are however not satisfied and raise their voices for a vigorous constitutional status – some even demanding cessation and independence.

Thus Major Alexander Brown ‑ British commandant of Gilgit Scouts ‑ in the light of popular will of the people in general (and with the help of the dissatisfied group of five junior commissioned officers from Hunza and Nager in particular), compensated for the machinations perpetrated by his fellow British in the past. 

MEESAQ 1947: Proposed and Penned by Safiullah Beg during the first meeting in July at our property in Sonikot Gilgit.

The officer, for these services, has belatedly been honored by the government of Pakistan after his death, by awarding Sitara‑e‑Pakistan in 1993. He was awarded MBE by the British government. Consequently Gilgit acceded to Pakistan and Sardar Alam Khan arrived as the first Political Agent from Pakistan.

Announcement published in the 1948 London Gazette which mentioned that the King “has been graciously pleased … to give orders for … appointments to the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire.…” The list included “Brown, Major (acting) William Alexander, Special List (ex-Indian Army).”

”In his memoirs, Gilgit Rebellion: The Major who Mutinied over the Partition of India, Brown described his encounter with Pakistan PM Liaquat Ali Khan: “Colonel Bacon, Colonel Iskander Mirza, and I were called into the ante-room. The Pakistan Premier was seated at a desk, poring over a large-scale map of Kashmir and Central Asia. …Mr Liaquat Ali Khan started by congratulating me and thanking me for all I had done in preserving peace in the Gilgit Agency.”

It is a travesty of justice and history to link GB with the Kashmir dispute.

In the first place the distinction between the Gilgit WAZARAT (SAT-MAQSO) and Gilgit agency has been confused. In 1935 SAT-MAQSO was taken on lease by the British from Kashmir. In 1947 when the decision was made to partition India into two countries the WAZARAT was returned to Kashmir, The Maharaja appointed Brigadier Gansara Singh as the governor of Gilgit WAZARAT in August 1947. Gilgit Scouts rebelled on the night of 31st October 1947, deposed the Governor and acceded to Pakistan. The local rulers in the GILGIT AGENCY responded and decided their accession to Pakistan through Quad-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Quaid-e-Azam accepted the accession and asked the Prime Minister to issue "a simplified Instrument of Accession" on the 6th of November 1947 - see MOST IMMEDIATE minute no 380-G initiated by Liagat Ali Khan. Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan as well as Mir of Nagar, Shaukat Ali Khan, signed this instrument on 19th November 1947.

Version of an Indian author:

THE FALL OF GILGIT
Lt. Col KS Samyal (Retd)

The entire north-west of the Indian sub-continent was, in the autumn of 1947, aflame with communal riots. In October 1947, the disturbances spread to the State of Jammu and Kashmir also. The Gilgit area of the state had an overwhelmingly Muslim population, made up of turbulent hill-men. The position was complicated by the existence of the semi-feudal principalities of Chitral, Hunza, Nagar etc which had been brought under Dogra rule in the 19th Century.

In July 1947, Gilgit was still being administered by the Government of India, to whom it had been made over by the State Government on lease for 60 years. The departure of the British from India being imminent, it was decided to terminate this lease and hand Gilgit back to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Late in July 1947, the State Government appointed Brig Ghansara Singh, one of the most senior officers of the State's Force, to be the Governor of Gilgit. He flew to Gilgit on 30 July 1947 and took over the administration from Lt Col Bacon, the British Political Agent, on 01 August 1947.

The local people, even though overwhelmingly Muslim, joyously welcomed the return of the Maharaja's administration after the period of British rule. Of the subordinate chiefs under the Governor of Gilgit, namely, the Mir of Hunza, the Mir of Nagar, the Raja of Punial, and the chieftains of Koh Ghizar, Yasin, and Ashkoman, only the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar were hostile.

Their hostility proved very damaging, for three-fourths of the men of the Gilgit Scouts came from Hunza and Nagar, and Subedar Major Babar Khan of the Scouts was the uncle of the Mir of Nagar and had married the sister of the Mir of Hunza.

The two British officers of the Gilgit Scouts whose services had been retained by the State, namely Major WA Brown and Captain Matheson, proved themselves inveterately hostile to Jammu & Kashmir State and took the leading part in the pro-Pakistan treachery at Gilgit. The predominantly Muslim civil employees of the Government of Gilgit were also pro-Pakistan and they backed the demands of the Scouts for special rates of pay and other concessions for serving the Jammu & Kashmir State soon after Brig Ghansara Singh took over charge.

It should be noted, however, that the Gilgit Scouts and the local people were still free from the violent communal passions then sweeping through the Punjab and did not favor killing or converting by force the non-Muslims at Gilgit.

Not the State's own Muslim troops. Gilgit area was garrisoned by 6 J&K Infantry, less than two companies with Headquarters at Bunji, about 54 kms from Gilgit on the road to Srinagar. Commanded by Lt. Col Abdul Majid Khan, the battalion was composed of Muslims and Sikhs in almost equal proportions. The Sikhs, according to the Commanding Officer, were raw recruits and were not fit for active duty for the next 5-6 months, till they had fired their musketry course. The Muslim companies had men from Punch and they having heard all about the horrible communal killings in Punjab, were in a violently communal frame of mind.

Wild rumors raged in Gilgit in the last week of October when the tribal invasion of Kashmir began. The common people remained friendly, but there was clear evidence that Major Brown and Sub Major Babar Khan of the Scouts were planning some trouble. Some locals advised the Governor to call up 6 J&K Infantry from Bunji, but Brig Ghansara Singh realised that State Force's Muslim men were as disaffected as and more violent than the Scouts. The Sikhs of 6 J&K Infantry could not be called up due to the opposition of Lt. Col Abdul Majid Khan, the Commanding Officer.

At about midnight between 31 October-1 November 1947, about 100 men of the Gilgit Scouts, led by Major Brown, Lieut Haidar Khan and Sub Major Babar Khan, surrounded the Governor's house and tried to steal in to capture him in sleep. He woke up, however, and started using his revolver, backed up by his orderly and driver who were handed a double-barrel shotgun and a sporting rifle.

The Scouts then opened machine gun fire on the house. Exchange of fire went on for several hours, and two men of the Gilgit Scouts were killed. Morning came, and with it a message from Major Brown asking Brigadier Ghansara Singh to surrender or else all non-Muslims in Gilgit would be killed. The Governor surrendered and was put under arrest.

The local people protested against this, and villagers from the surrounding areas began to gather in Gilgit. The Scouts' leaders managed to pacify them and sent them away, but probably this demonstration of the people's affection saved the Governor and other non-Muslims from being murdered in cold blood. Lt Col Abdul Majid Khan, the CO of 6 J&K Infantry, was also imprisoned by the Gilgit Scouts and their British officers.

Immediately after this, steps were taken by the conspirators to annihilate the Sikh troops at Bunji. A Sikh post at Janglot was treacherously attacked at night by Muslim troops of 6 J&K Infantry and the Gilgit Scouts and the entire garrison was killed, except for a lone survivor who managed to cross the icy Indus river on a log of wood.

On hearing the news from Gilgit and Janglot, the Sikh company at Bunji dispersed and the men tried to find their way out to Gurais via Astor. But the Scouts from Chilas under the personal command of Captain Matheson were already guarding that route and prevented all escape. The Sikhs wandered through the high, snow-covered mountains for days without food and were captured one by one.

The entire Gilgit region passed into the hands of Pakistan early in November 1947. At first a provisional Government was formed, of which the leaders were Major Brown, Captain Hassan, Captain Ehsan Ali, Captain Muhammad Khan, Captain Sayeed, Lieut Haidar, and Sub Major Babar Khan. It is notable that none of the local Rajas nor any member of the public was included in the Provisional Government.

On 3 November 1947, Major Brown held a flag hoisting ceremony at Gilgit in the Socut Lines. After about a fortnight, one Sardar Mohammad Alam, a Pathan and obviously a nominee of Pakistan, came from Peshawar and took over the administration as Political Agent at Gilgit. No "Azad Govt" was established there, even in name.

But the control of Gilgit areas enabled Pakistan to operate towards Gurais as well as to attack Skardu.

K S Samyal,
J&K Ex-services League,
Ambphalla,
Jammu - 180005.
Telex-0191-2564326

After the brutal tribal invasion organised and supported by Pakistan, on October 26, 1947, Singh decided to sign an Instrument of Accession and joined India. However, Maj. Brown refused to acknowledge the orders of the Maharaja, under the pretext that some leaders of the Frontier Districts Province (Gilgit-Baltistan) wanted to join Pakistan. He took upon himself to hand over the entire area to Pakistan on November 1, 1947.

The article said: “The bloodless coup d’etat was planned by Brown to the last detail under the code name ‘Datta Khel’, 

Another version of history:

https://windowtogb.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-gilgit-revoution-1947-anonymous.html 

LATEST ON HISTORY

GILGIT REBELLION
Gilgit Baltistan Scouts identify themselves with Gilgit Scouts which were raised in 1889. This force played a key role in fighting the war of liberation against Dogra / Indian Forces in 1947/1948 and won independence for the people of Northern Areas (now Gilgit Baltistan). Gilgit Scouts were further reinforced by raising of Northern and Karakorum Scouts. These three Corps of Scouts subsequently merged in 1974 to form Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Units.

After the Kargil conflict, in 1999 the Northern Light Infantry Units were given the status of regular Army. The need of having Civil Armed Force in the Northern Areas remained a constant demand of the people since 1974. NA Scouts, therefore emerged as 5th Civil Armed Force of Pakistan on 31 October 2003. 

With the imposition of "Empowerment and Self Governance Order" in 2009, Northern Areas were given the name of Gilgit Baltistan. Consequently Northern Area Scouts being a Federal Civil Armed Force in this region was also renamed as Gilgit Baltistan Scouts on 17 January 2011.
RELATED: BBC Urdu - 7 Episodes: 

WAR IN KASHMIR, YOUTUBE:  A TIMES NOW Exclusive, this documentary series gives an insight into the conflict-ridden region, showcasing facts as they are. The purely observational piece of storytelling is an honest attempt to showcase life in the Kashmir valley. Watch Kashmir The Story here. #Kashmir #KashmirTheStory #TimesNow

RELATED NARRATIVE FROM INDIA:

Hunza Reservists in the Gilgit Scouts (1913–1947)

The Gilgit Scouts, raised in 1913, are remembered as one of the most significant frontier forces of British India. But their legacy cannot be understood without acknowledging the indispensable contribution of Hunza men—both regulars and reservists—who defended the northernmost borders of the subcontinent in one of the most turbulent eras of global politics.

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The Geopolitical Backdrop: The “Great Game”

By the late 19th and early 20th century, Central Asia was the chessboard of imperial rivalry between the Russian Empire and the British Raj. Russia’s advances into Central Asia and its presence in the Pamirs threatened to spill southwards. The British, anxious about India’s security, established the Gilgit Agency in 1877 (re-established in 1889 after a brief withdrawal).

Hunza, perched on the high Karakoram, held special significance:

• Its passes (Mintaka, Kilik, Khunjerab, Shimshal) connected directly to Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang).
• The Hunza Mir, through tradition and loyalty, maintained flexible ties with both British India and China, making Hunza a frontier of diplomacy as much as defense.
• The hardy Hunzakuts, accustomed to high-altitude survival, became the natural choice for recruitment.

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Formation of the Gilgit Scouts (1913)

When Colonel John Biddulph Kelly raised the Gilgit Scouts in August 1913, the force replaced unreliable tribal levies with a disciplined, semi-regular corps. It consisted of around 656 men organized into companies drawn from Hunza, Nagar, Punial, Yasin, and Ishkoman.

The Mir of Hunza cooperated actively with the British, ensuring steady recruitment from his principality. Hunza men were often regarded as the most reliable of the Scouts, combining agility in mountain warfare with deep loyalty to their ruler.

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The Hunza Reservist System: A Unique Military Model

While some Hunza men served as permanent Scouts, many were enrolled as reservists. This system was innovative:

• Household Contribution: Each household in Hunza was expected to provide at least one able-bodied man for military service.
• Training & Arms: Reservists underwent periodic training and kept their rifles and kit ready at home.
• Dual Role: They lived civilian lives as farmers, herders, and traders, yet could be mobilized instantly for emergencies.
• Community Integration: This arrangement ensured every family had a stake in frontier defense, blending military readiness with social cohesion.

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Strategic Frontier Duties

Hunza reservists were deployed in some of the most challenging environments:

• Pass Guardians: Patrolling Khunjerab, Shimshal, Darkot, and Mustagh passes.
• Escort Services: Providing protection for British explorers, officers, and surveyors venturing into the Pamirs and Wakhan.
• Supply & Communication Lines: Carrying loads across glaciers and mountains, ensuring the mobility of the Scouts.
• Cross-Border Vigilance: Keeping watch over movements of traders, pilgrims, or suspected Russian and German agents during wartime.

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The Gilgit Scouts in World War I

During the First World War (1914–1918), the Gilgit Scouts played a critical role despite not being deployed in overseas battles. The northern frontier became a silent battlefield of the Great Game, where espionage and propaganda replaced open conflict.

• Surveillance: The Scouts closely monitored suspected Ottoman and German agents trying to stir anti-British sentiments in Central Asia.
• Coordination: They worked with the British Consulate in Kashgar (Xinjiang) to exchange intelligence.
• Defense-in-Depth: Outposts stretched from Gilgit to the Chinese frontier, with Hunza reservists forming the backbone of forward patrols.

Although their efforts rarely made headlines, their vigilance ensured the northern approaches into India remained sealed at a time when global empires were collapsing.

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Subsidies and Political Bargains

In recognition of Hunza’s role, the British provided annual subsidies to the Mir of Hunza. This financial support reinforced the Mir’s authority, kept Hunza loyal to the Raj, and acknowledged the importance of its people in the defense of the empire’s most remote frontier.

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Transition and 1947: Defining Moments

By 1947, as the British prepared to withdraw from India, the Gilgit Scouts—staffed heavily by Hunza men—found themselves at the heart of history.

• On 1 November 1947, they revolted against the Dogra governor, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, bringing an end to Dogra rule in Gilgit.
• Hunza reservists and Scouts stood side by side in the bloodless coup that secured the region’s accession to Pakistan.
• The tradition of loyalty and discipline they had nurtured since 1913 now shaped the destiny of the entire Gilgit-Baltistan region.

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Conclusion

The service of Hunza men as reservists in the Gilgit Scouts was not merely a military arrangement—it was a political contract, a social obligation, and a legacy of frontier resilience.

It linked Hunza to the larger currents of global geopolitics, integrated its people into statecraft, and positioned the valley as a decisive actor in the turbulent transition from empire to nationhood.

Hunza reservists remain a reminder that even in the most remote corners of the Karakoram, ordinary mountain men shaped the grand strategies of empires and the birth of new nations.

RELATED: LIBRATION & GILGIT SCOUTS

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STATUS OF GB PART-II

RELATED: a must read Hermann Kreutzmann, Key Note Speech, DIRECT DEMOCRACY; COMMITTEE REPORT, PETITION, WAR IN KASHMIR, GILGIT REBELLION
Recently I came across copy of the judgement given by the High Court of Judicature Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 8-03-1993 on a petition filed on 16-10-1990 by one Malik Muhammad Miskeen and Haji Amir Jan, both residents of Tangir. This document has prompted me to share my views [based on the written views of GOP as well as the historical accounts reproduced on different blogposts CLICK]. 

Image of the written Instrument of Accession to Pakistan rendered by the Mir of Hunza

Image of the written Instrument of Accession to Pakistan rendered by the Mir of Nager on a plain paper in Urdu characters.

Image of the written Instrument of Accession to Pakistan rendered by the Governor of Puniyal on a plain paper in Urdu characters.

The administrative status existing in the area at the time of the events in 1947 were as under:

• Gilgit Wizarat  - Gilgit proper with its immediate surrounding district is known as the Gilgit Sub-division, and up till 1935 the Sub-division was administered by Kashmir. The Gilgit Sub-division should not be confused with the Gilgit Agency. The former is about one tenth the area of the latter. In 1935 the British Government appreciated the necessity for the Sub-division being included in the Agency and coming under the direct control of the Political Agent owing to the increasing infiltration into Chinese Sinkiang of Russians. The Sub-division was therefore leased from the Maharaja of Kashmir for a period of sixty years and the entire area was taken under the absolute control of the Political Agent.
  
  
• Chilas & Republics of Darel and Tangir - Administered by the Assistant Political Agent in Chilas with a native "Raja Ardal".
• Political Districts of Punial, Gupis/Koh-e-Ghezir, Yasin and Ishkoman - Each headed by an appointed native Governor with restricted autonomy and under considerable control of the Political Agent.
• Mirs of Hunza and Nager - Hereditary and almost independent with only limitation of conducting foreign affairs in which consultation with the Political Agent in Gilgit was a requirement.

Gilgit Scouts

Gilgit Scouts can be identified with part time force recruited through the local rulers from the Agency populations considered friendly, loyal and reliable by the British officials of the agency as Levis in 1889. The force was established as a regular entity by the British officials in Gilgit Agency when the Gilgit Wazarat (SAT-MAQSU) came in the direct control of British Political Agent after lease in 1935 towards administration, security within the Agency and the borders against threats from Russia. This force played a key role in fighting the war of liberation against Dogra / Indian Forces operating in the region in 1947/1948 and won independence for the people of Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan).

The loyalty of local rulers to the British can be witnessed in the rare video I shared recently through my wall.

British India - Discussions on future of Gilgit

Official history of liberation: Ian Stephens - the man made responsible by President Ayub Khan to compile the official history of Pakistan - describes the the relevant history as follows:
“This was not locally liked, but it was tolerated in the belief that, as Kashmir was a Muslim majority state, the Maharajah, despite his personal will, would soon act along the lines of Lord Mountbatton’s advice to the Princes generally in July, and accede to Pakistan. When the startling news came on 26 October of the Maharajah’s accession of Kashmir to India, the locals of Gilgit were outraged and so were the Muslim officers posted to Gilgit scouts and a few to the Maharajah’s army located at Bunji. Mullahs in the villages started preaching ‘JEHAD’ against the Dogra regime. Reports came that the neighboring Princely states of Swat and Chitral, which had joined Pakistan, were about to invade; Muslim soldier in the predominantly Sikh garrison at Bunji, on the far side of Indus, caused a disturbance; on the other hand, local Sikh and Hindu traders in Gilgit Bazaar were known to have arms. By the evening of 31 October, tension locally became such that, in the scout commandant’s view mutiny and slaughter, resulting in general chaos, could only be forestalled by prompt acceptance of what unquestionably was the prevailing popular will. He therefore sent a platoon to request the Hindu Governor to come to the Scout’s lines for protection and simultaneously ordered his colleague (Captain Matheson) detachments from Chilas (headed by Subedar Sher Ali of Yasin), as well as those from Gilgit (headed by Subedar Safiullah Beg) to hold the Indus River Crossings and prevent 6th Kashmir Infantry troops from Bunji getting over to Gilgit and undo the coup.
Some casualties ensued at the crossings and indeed on the Gilgit Residency’s moonlit lawns too, because the governor resisted custody and fired on the scouts and their sympathizers from his windows, killing one soldier from Hunza. But within a few hours, the affair was effectively over; and on 2nd November the Pakistan Flag was run up amidst public acclaims”.

Thus Major Alexander Brown ‑ British commandant of Gilgit Scouts ‑ in the light of popular will of the people in general (and with the help of the dissatisfied group of five junior commissioned officers from Hunza and Nager in particular), compensated for the machinations perpetrated by his fellow British in the past.

MEESAQ 1947: Proposed and Penned by Safiullah Beg during the first meeting in July at our property in Sonikot Gilgit.

 The officer, for these services, has belatedly been honored by the government of Pakistan after his death, by awarding Sitara‑e‑Pakistan in 1993. Consequently Gilgit acceded to Pakistan and Sardar Alam Khan arrived as the first Political Agent from Pakistan.

After the events starting on the evening of 31st October and 01st November both the Mirs and the Governors of the Political Districts  excecised their option to accede to Pakistan [obviously in consonance with the wishes of the populations]  their territories and communicated the same either in writing or verbally to Major William Brown, Commandant GILGIT SCOUTS - the leader of rebellion - and obvious authority in Gilgit at that time, who in turn communicated it through wireless messages to Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Prime Minister [CM] NWFP Peshawar as well as Col Bacon PA Khyber [the last British Political Agent in Gilgit] with an additional request to post a Pakistan Government Political Agent expeditiously.

GOP Record

 In the light of this voluntary accession to Pakistan this petition and the judgment given by the High Court appears to be out of place for the majority of regions constituting GB of today.

"Yesterday is not ours to recover, but tomorrow is ours to win or to lose."- Lyndon B. Johnson

In the follow-up talks with Mir of Hunza [and other delegates from Hunza as well as Nager and other regions of Gilgit Agency] at Karachi in 1950 with PM Liaqat Ali Khan it was agreed that the two states of Hunza and Nager [and the Political Districts] would continue with their historical autonomous status with the further surety of enjoying the privileges associated with Pakistan Citizenship. This commitment of the government of Pakistan was however dishonored by PM Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1974 without resolving the new “Constitutional Status” vis-à-vis Pakistan.
Emotional manipulation. 
Historically local rulers with the consent of populations have acceded to Pakistan in November 1947. There was no constitution, first one adopted in 1956 followed by another one in 1960 and then the current one in 1973. However ZAB squashed the conditions of accession and introduced a Constitutional limbo which is being exploited by the countries historically poised as enemies of Pakistan using the emotionally charged slogan through indigenous cohorts.
It is a travesty of justice and history to link GB with the Kashmir dispute.
In the first place the distinction between the Gilgit WAZARAT (SAT-MAQSO) and Gilgit agency has been confused. In 1935 SAT-MAQSO was taken on lease by the British from Kashmir. In 1947 when the decision was made to partition India into two countries the WAZARAT was returned to Kashmir, The Maharaja appointed Brigadier Gansara Singh as the governor of Gilgit WAZARAT in August 1947. Gilgit Scouts rebelled on the night of 31st October 1947, deposed the Governor and acceded to Pakistan. The local rulers in the GILGIT AGENCY responded and decided their accession to Pakistan through Quad-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Quaid-e-Azam accepted the accession and asked the Prime Minister to issue "a simplified Instrument of Accession" on the 6th of November 1947 - see MOST IMMEDIATE minute no 380-G initiated by Liagat Ali Khan. Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan as well as Mir of Nagar, Shaukat Ali Khan, signed this instrument on 19th November 1947.

The coming governments in Pakistan need to resolve this limbo and satisfy the younger generations whose emotions are being exploited by the ill-wishers of this country by harping on the appealing slogan of “Constitutional Status”.
NOTE-1: Update: Read on this link: COMMITTEE
NOTE-2: The delegates from Hunza for parleys in Karachi were:

· Mir Muhammad Jamal Khan HI [Hon Maj Gen]
.  Prince Ayash Khan - brother and secretary to  the Mir
· Wazir Inayatullah Beg
· Trangfa Inayat Ali
· Haji Qudratullah Beg [Nazim-e- Umur]

This was the same delegation from Hunza which had gone for the inconclusive discussions with Maharaja Kashmir in the month of Jul 1947, prior to the developments in Gilgit in the months of October and November that year. 
A picture of the Mir and some of those accompanying him to  Kashmir can be seen in this rare picture:

Interestingly, Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan then a child of 8 years and me a mere 5-years old also visited Karachi – for the first time in our lives – in accompaniment of our parents. A family picture taken in a Karachi studio is appended:

NOTE-3: In order to grasp the relation of the "for information" [col R.N. BACON/H.R.H AGA KHAN] addressies in this instrument of accession, as well as the approach to government of Pakistan through CM [ Khan Abdul Qayum Khan] NWFP the readers need to know the background in following account: 

·        “Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, Premier of the North West Frontier Province, gave a radio broadcast last night which was heard in the Gilgit Bazaar. He pledged the support of all Pathans in liberating the people of Kashmir from Dogra domination. This rousing speech has had a profound effect on the people of Gilgit.”

·        “I want you to speak to the Mir of Hunza on the telephone in Burushaski. Ask him whether he and his people wish to accede to India, Pakistan, or remain independent. Also ask him whether the Governor has telephoned him in this connection in the last twelve hours.”  

·        “Tell the Commandant Sahib,” the Mir said, “that I am a Muslim and my people are Muslims. Are we unbelievers that we should join India or stay aloof by remaining independent? There is only one way for us to go and that is to Pakistan and we shall join Pakistan.

·        I accompanied the Bacons as far as Jaglote. The Colonel, I discovered, was a remarkable man. With only my sketchy outline of conditions in the Sub-agency, where he had never previously served, he appreciated the situation immediately and gave shrewd and astute observations and suggestions on how to get the situation under control. His success in getting the utmost out of his juniors lay in his ability to pass on instructions in the form of suggestions and not as dictatorial orders; and yet they were always carried out. He would enter into the spirit of any scheme with great enthusiasm and discuss it in a matter of fact manner for hours until it was reduced to the simplicity of routine action rather than a major problem.

·        We then chatted about things in general for a bit and as the bar emptied he suddenly turned to me and said, “ Listen to this one, William, but keep it under your hat,” and this is the information the Colonel gave me. “On 1 August this year the entire Gilgit Agency will be handed over to the ‘‘ Maharaja of Kashmir and we shall withdraw entirely. I have just flown from Gilgit to Srinagar to discuss this matter, with the Resident and with the Maharaja. As yet I have not approached the matter with the Mirs, Governors, and people, so I cannot give you their reactions but they will all naturally be very sad to see us go. It is unlikely that the Maharaja will employ a British Officer as Political Agent and he will in all probability send up one of his own staff as Governor of the country. The Maharaja, however, is aware of the difficulties which will arise from officering the Scouts with Hindu, or Muslim Officers for that matter as they have never before served under anyone but British Officers It is therefore probable that he will employ a British Officer as Commandant and possibly one both as second in command and Assistant Political Agent, Chilas These officers would serve on a private contract until the transition from British to Kashmiri had been effected gradually. The officers wouId, of course, have to relinquish their commissions and be taken on in an entirely private capacity. They will always be in a very awkward position; they will have no redress for grievances, and at all times they will have to use the utmost diplomacy in dealing with Kashmiri officials. It will be nothing like the old days and I know that none of the officers at present in the Scouts would ever dream of staying on. In fact think the Maharaja will have great difficulty in getting British Officers who are prepared to accept this mercenary appointment. I don’t suppose you would think of going back as Commandant under these conditions, would you?”

·        All that Gilgit wanted was the peace and security afforded under the Pax Britannica, and the method by which this could have been continued, despite partition, would have been have made the Gilgit Agency an Agency of the North-West Frontier Province, directly under H.E. the Governor. This would have ensured a continuity in administration, peace, security and unity: unfertile ground for Soviet seed. My duty was obvious. I must return to Gilgit and lead, advise and help the people over the transition period.

·        So when Colonel Bacon put the question to me I replied, “Yes, I would like to go back, very much, Sir.”

·       “Right. William,” he said. “When I get back to Srinagar tomorrow I shall put forward a strong recommendation on your behalf as I consider you are the right man for the job and you are fully aware of what you are in for and the difficulties and obstructions you will meet, I think the chances are that H.H. the Maharaja will probably agree, but anyway let’s wait and see.”

·         I immediately realised that Colonel Bacon had kept his promise and that I am going back to Gilgit.

·        To:              BROWN

From:         ABDUL QAYUM          100900

Mohammed Alam being sent to you as soon as possible with instructions.

·        The news was then announced in the Bazaar by beat of drum, and orders were issued that a royal welcome should be accorded to the Representative of the Dominion of Pakistan who was arriving on the morrow. I meanwhile had telephoned the news to the Mirs and Rajas. They were overjoyed to hear it, and promised they would make all haste to Gilgit.[he arrived on 16th November]

Celebration - Governor House on 01 November 1947

The document in question can be accessed by cliking this link  COURT VERDICT ON GB 1990 while two pages containing the judgement are placed below for the information of the readers of this blog.

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قدرتءالله  کی  حقیقی  بهائی  هین

THE GILGIT REBELLION 1947 By William A. Brown

  I have posted this book because it is an important source from the point of view of giving a true state of events and the persons relevant to the freedom of Gilgit and Baltistan in 1947-48.
GILGIT SCOUTS, NEW EDITION

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PREFACE

[William Alexander Brown, 1922-1984]

William Alexander Brown, Willie to his friends, was born in Melrose in the Scottish Borders on 22 December 1922. His father, William Neilson Brown, had served with distinction in the Gordon Highlanders during World War I, and had been awarded the Military Cross. His grandfather, Alexander Laing Brown, had been Liberal MP for the Border Burghs from 1886 to 1892. The Brown family had played a prominent part in the development of the woollen trade in the Borders: they were responsible for building some of the first mills in Selkirk, Galashiels and Hawick.

William Brown was educated at St Mary’s Preparatory School, Melrose, and George Watsons College, Edinburgh. In April 194l, on leaving school, he enlisted in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

In December 1941 he sailed for India. Here, he attended the Officer Cadet training unit at Bangalore and was then commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant into the 10/12 Frontier Force Regiment.  He transferred almost at once to the Frontier Corps of Scouts and Militia, serving initially in the South Waziristan Scouts on the Afghan border of the North Western Frontier Province. He soon became proficient in Pushto, the language of the Pathans.

In early 1943 William Brown was posted to the Gilgit Agency where he spent the next three years, for a time serving as Assistant Political Agent in Chilas (when he was responsible for the construction of the Chilas Polo Ground still in use today). He travelled widely throughout the Gilgit Agency in Hunza, Nagir, Yasin, Ishkoman, Punial and Guh Khizr, gaining experience which was to stand him in good stead when he had to face the Gilgit crisis of 1947 which is described in detail in this book. While in the Gilgit Agency during this time he learnt Shina the lingua franca of the region, as well as some Burushaski, the language of Hunza. Some impression of his first time in the Gilgit Agency is conveyed in Chapter 1 of this book.

In 1946, after Gilgit, William Brown served briefly in the Tochi Scouts, based in North Waziristan, and then in June 1947 he was posted to Chitral as Acting Commandant Scouts there.

In Peshawar, enroute for Chitral, he was told by Lt.—Colonel Roger Bacon, then Political Agent in Gilgit, that the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, had decided (for reasons which were not clear to Bacon and which are still not clear) that the 1935 British lease of the Gilgit Agency fiom the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir (a lease which still had 49 years to run) was going to be terminated and that the Agency, with a 99% Muslim population, was going to be returned to the Hindu rule of the Dogra Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. The actual transfer would take place, Colonel Bacon told him, on 1 August 1947 two weeks before the recently announced end of the British Indian Empire on 15 August. It was put to him that he would be a suitable candidate for the position of the Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts during and after this period of transition. William Brown while fully appreciating the difficulties and dangers involved, and angry that the British could so callously return without any preparation or warning the Muslim people of the Gilgit Agency to by no means congenial Hindu rule, volunteered for the task even though it meant leaving the British service and become in effect a mercenary employed by the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir.

After a very brief period in Chitral the position of Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts was indeed offered to him. He accepted at once. He was given the acting rank of Major. On 29 July 1947 he arrived in Gilgit just in time to witness the formal handover on 1 August, when the British flag was lowered and that of Jammu & Kashmir raised in its place. Colonel Bacon, the last British Political Agent, departed: his place was taken by Brigadier Ghansara Singh the representative of the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir.

What followed between August 1947 and January 1948, when William Brown was finally withdrawn from Gilgit (now part of Pakistan), is described in considerable detail in Chapters II to V of this book. One must always remember that when these events took place William Brown was only 24 or 25 years old (he celebrated his 25th birthday in Gilgit). One must also remember that once William Brown had embarked upon the process which resulted in the Gilgit Agency declaring for Pakistan he was technically in a state of mutiny against the Government of State of Jammu & Kashmir.  Had he been captured by the Maharaja’s forces, he would almost certainly have been put to death, as he well knew.

After his return from Gilgit in 1948, William Brown was transferred to the Frontier Constabulary, the police force of the North Western Frontier Province (by now, of course,  of Pakistan) in which he served in various capacities for the next two years.

In July 1948 William Brown was awarded the MBE (Military) with a citation so unspecific that it was not clear what lay behind this acknowledgement of his merits. He assumed that somewhere within the British military establishment there were those who approved of what he had done in Gilgit to ensure that this region went to Pakistan rather than to India. He was only too aware that there were other leading British figures, not least Lord Mountbatten, who were far from pleased by his intervention in the affairs of the post British Subcontinent.

William Brown felt deeply attached to Pakistan and did not wish to leave the country. He sought therefore, some position there in commerce after leaving the Frontier Constabulary. Sir George Cunningham, formerly Governor of the North West Frontier Province (and who figures in this book, as the reader will see), obtained for him a position in Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) as a Sales Executive. Unfortunately, in this capacity his first posting was for Calcutta in India. During his time in Gilgit William Brown had evidently made a number of determined enemies among the Sikhs, perhaps because of his involvement (described in the book) in the destruction of the Sikh component of the 6th Kashmir Infantry in Bunji. In Calcutta he was set upon by Sikhs and left for dead in the street. Miraculously he was found by a doctor and he recovered. He was then posted to Karachi in Pakistan.

In early 1957 William Brown met Margaret Rosemary Cooksley, who was serving with the UK High Commission in Karachi. They married. In 1958 a son, William, was born.

William Brown was a keen sportsman. While at school he had become a good marksman, having shot at Bisley where he captained the school team. When; with the War, cartridges became scarce, he became interested in falconry. While in Gilgit, the local national game of polo captured his enthusiasm and he became very skilled at it: he had already become a superb horseman. In later years in Karachi he played polo using at times Gilgit tactics which did not always win universal approval. Also in Karachi William Brown took up racing as an armature jockey and as a trainer, in both capacities with some success.

During these Karachi years he did not lose touch with the mountains of the old Gilgit Agency. He became the local secretary for Pakistan of the Himalayan Society and helped many expeditions coming to Pakistan to climb in the Karakorum, Hindu Kush, Pamir’s and Himalaya.

In 1959 William Brown and his family returned to the United Kingdom. He felt that the day of the expatriate in the commerce of the subcontinent was passing and that it was time to head for home. As by this time he could not imagine a life without horses, in 1960 he established livery yard and riding school, Glenside Stables, in the village of St Boswells in the Duke of Buccleuch’s Hunt country. Here he remained respected as teacher and judge of horses for the next twenty-four years. During this time there were four more children Frances, Timothy Katy and Helen.

On 5 December 1984 a week before his 62nd birthday, William Brown died after a sudden heart attack. Few of his wide circle of friends had appreciated quite what an impact on the history of South Asia he had had during his time in Gilgit in 1947 and early 1948 since he never spoke of his adventures in those days they were surprised when accounts of the Gilgit Rebellion the subject of this book, appeared in obituaries in The Times, The Daily Telegraph and various local Border newspapers. Indeed it was only after his death that the full truth about what he had achieved in Gilgit made his enormous contribution to the future success of Pakistan began to come to light. Hitherto for a variety of reasons, which need not concern us here, there had been a tendency to minimise, if not ignore entirely, his part in the great events of 1947 which are the subject of this book. In the end, justice to his memory was to some measure,  done with the awarding, on Independence Day 1993, of the medal Sitara-i-Pakistan as a posthumous recognition by Pakistan of his great contribution. His widow Margaret received the medal in Islamabad from the hands of President Leghari on Pakistan Day, 23 March 1994.

William Brown is buried in Benrig churchyard, in the heart of the Border country, which he had loved so much. On his gravestone is engraved the Ibex head badge of the Gilgit Scouts and the legend, DATA KHEL. 31.10.47 (the significance of which will become apparent to the readers of this book).

A word about this book. William Brown kept a diary until at least until his return from Gilgit in January 1948. The actual diary has been lost (apparently it was stolen) but at some point before 1950, probably as early as 1948, William Brown wrote it up in narrative form, perhaps intending to publish it. In the end it was not published and the top copy was lost. A carbon copy however, survived. This is what is reproduced below. There has been the absolute minimum of editorial interference. A few pages have been omitted, mainly because they digress from the main thrust of the narrative. Spelling has, we hope, been standardised and there have been minor alterations in schemes of punctuation. Otherwise, this is what William Brown wrote when the events described were still fresh in his mind after the passage of no more than a year or so and with his diary before him. In many ways it is a unique document, the story of an adventure of a kind which William Brown may well have been the last Briton to experience in the Indian Subcontinent with the passing of the British Raj. It was an adventure, moreover, which changed the course of history to an extent that few other individuals can have achieved. Without William Brown it is more than likely that in the end the Gilgit region would have passed into the hands of India. Pakistan would have been cut off for ever from Central Asia. India would have been in direct contact with Afghanistan, in many respects at least, is hostile to Pakistan as ever India has been. What would the fate of Pakistan have been in I best, circumstances?

Many people helped in the preparation of this memoir for the press. We would particularly like to thank Shah Khan for his assistance in the verification of material relating to the Gilgit region in the years 1947-48. Crown copyright material from the British Library (India office Records) is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationary Office.

Click this LINK , also INDEPENDANCE DAY KEYNOTE SPEECH

I am Emma Brown, daughter in law of Margaret Brown, who thanks you for your response and who also sends on her regards. Indeed she has frequented Hunza on many occasions and has always spoken so dearly of the place and the people. I am glad to hear that it has been a genuine misunderstanding and it is also nice to see that you have the same passion about the book as we do. We are however in the process of designing a website and having the book available to be downloaded as well as hopefully a reprint in hard copy. We would therefore ask if you could please remove the book from your blog - Margaret is happy for you to keep the preface, but not the rest of the contents online. We are hoping to re-publish the book in the near future with extra content - as since the first publication there have been so many friends of 'Willies' who have come forward with more information, which we are in the process of compiling. Obviously, with your passion we would welcome any thoughts you have, as ultimately our aim is to bring the story to a new generation. I shall keep you posted as we get everything up and running. Kind Regards Emma

BACK REFERENCE TO THIS POST:   COMMENTS BY A READER, A BLOGPOST, STATUS OF GB, GILGIT SCOUTS, MEESAQ 1947: Proposed and Penned by Safiullah Beg during the first meeting in July at our property in Sonikot Gilgit.