One Belt One Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), is a global development strategy launched by China in 2013 under President Xi Jinping. Its goal is to enhance global trade and stimulate economic growth across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond by building infrastructure and broadening trade links. Here's a breakdown:

Key Components

The Silk Road Economic Belt (Land-based):

Focuses on reviving the ancient Silk Road trade route.
Connects China with Europe via Central Asia and the Middle East.
Includes highways, railways, pipelines, and industrial zones.

The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (Sea-based):
Focuses on connecting China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe via sea routes.
Involves building and expanding ports and maritime infrastructure.

Objectives

Economic Development:
Boost trade and investment between participating countries.
Reduce transportation costs and improve connectivity.
Infrastructure Building:
Construct roads, railways, ports, airports, and energy projects.
Modernize underdeveloped regions, especially in Asia and Africa.

Global Influence:

Strengthen China's economic and political influence internationally.
Create interdependencies to enhance China's role in global governance.

Geographical Scope

The BRI spans over 140 countries across:
Asia
Europe
Africa
Parts of Oceania and Latin America

Notable Projects

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC):

A network of infrastructure projects linking China to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
Aims to connect western China to the Arabian Sea.

Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port (Myanmar)

:
Provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean.

Africa's Railway Networks:

Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway.
Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway (Kenya).

European Connectivity:

Freight trains between China and European cities like Duisburg (Germany) and Madrid (Spain).

Controversies and Criticism (mostly by West)

Debt Diplomacy:

Critics argue that some BRI projects saddle participating countries with unsustainable debt.

Example: Sri Lanka leasing its Hambantota Port to China after struggling to repay loans.

Environmental Concerns:

Infrastructure projects have raised alarms about environmental degradation.

Transparency Issues:

Lack of clear processes for financing and project approvals.

Geopolitical Rivalries:

Some countries see the BRI as a means for China to expand its strategic dominance.

Impact

Economic Growth: Several countries have seen economic benefits through improved connectivity.
Strategic Influence: Strengthened China's ties with developing nations.
Global Polarization: Some nations, like the U.S. and India, view the BRI as a challenge to their strategic interests.

The Belt and Road Initiative remains a transformative but polarizing global development strategy, with its long-term success still a subject of debate. Would you like more details on any specific aspect?

Vital step towards Preservation of Economical Interests of GB

Harmonization of Customary Laws on NATURAL RESOURCES

It is a well-known historical fact that residents of Gilgit-Baltistan were not much concerned about the prospects for natural resource development in achieving better quality of life for themselves. In recent decades the government and many NGO's working in the area has helped change that situation. The indigenous populations are aware of their natural resources and desire to use these for economical uplift. The Social organizations such as LSOs facilitated by AKRSP are suited to undertake their own development agenda. In the past there has been a common practice of awarding leases for mineral development to non-resident entrepreneurs and thus a number of leases are being held in detriment to development of local economy. I am appealing through these lines to: 

1.        Review the Northern Area Policy on awarding these leases to non-residents in Future.

2.       Review the existing leases, cancel them and re-award these to local collective entities.

(Extract from my letter send to the Chief executive in 2008.)

RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS (by Sabahuddin)

Summary of individual attempts in this direction are:

A.      2003 to 2006: As civil society member of KIU syndicate started advocacy to establish a MINERAL DEVELOPMENT department. Same was ultimately established with inputs/training/infrastructure from Italy during tenure of Dr. Najam as VC.

B.      2007: Advocacy with UCA in Khorog Tajikistan for collaboration with KIU. Subsequently a team from KIU visited UCA (Recent agreement covering collaboration in many matters is a matter of satisfaction).

C.      Rupani Foundation: Chairman AKRSP sent Mr. Nasruddin Rupani with Mr. Muzaffar RPO (now GM) to ask me to join and help the foundation in establishing training facilities for Gemstone cutting and polishing throughout the region. Six facilities established in GB (including one in Hunza under KADO, and another in Aliabad through USAID), three in Chitral, six in Afghanistan and one in Khorog Tajikistan.

D.      2008 – 2019: Advocacy with all speakers, many members of the legislative assembly (including the present CM GB), interim PM Pakistan (who asked through a letter to GB government for comments on my proposal) and the CIVIL SOCIETY at large through my blog and meetings.

E.      Written communication to all concerned on the specific implications of GOP order 2018 as well as the provisions of agreements in the context of CPEC.

F.       Repeat of communication to the VC KIU in 2018 on revival of activity in this direction.
My worry - Plundering of natural resources by external entrepreneurs through facilitation by self centered indigenous cohorts. If we can not benefit at this stage, these resources must be preserved for future generations while attempting to facilitate grooming of productive human resources through state of Art technology available to every home. The investment policy of GB must take into account that exploitation of natural resources should not happen. Inherent dangers in the 2018 Order by GOP point to this danger being sponsored at governing levels.

I hope CIVIL SOCIETY (which includes political leaders) realize the importance of this topic and mobilize the populations. Just India alone purchases the ROUGH (mostly through questionable procedures) from these countries and earns 28 billion dollars annually by processing and value addition.
A message to the decision makers. See this history, GB is not a captured territory to be treated as a colony. We acceded to Pakistan.

First priority for GB assembly and PTI government: Attempt legislation on DISTRICT and VILLAGE governments and CUSTOMARY LAWS to protect NATURAL RESOURCES from exploitation of sharks from outside the region. Repeal of GOP order 2018 which has paved the way for this exploitation.

Acknowledgment/پیغام موصول

×

Complaint Code: GB281120-87634216

Respected Citizen, We received your complaint (GB281120-87634216), Which is assigned to (Chief Secretary Gilgit Baltistan). Please Note: Complaint resolution time is 20 to 41 days.

قابل احترام شہری ، ہمیں آپ کی شکایت موصول ہوئی (GB281120-87634216) جو (Chief Secretary Gilgit Baltistan) کو تفویض کی گئی ہے۔ براہ کرم نوٹ کریں: شکایت کے حل کا وقت 20 سے 41 دن کا ہے۔

3Ameeyn Muhammad, Manzoor Hussain and 1 other

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Relevance of Network of Local Social Organisations (LSOs) in GB to China-Pakistan Economical Corridor (CPEC)

RELATED: GAWADAR-KKH, MILITANCY ON KKH, INTERNATIONAL DESIGNS, SECTARIAN CONFLICT, ALTERNATE VIEWS ON SECTARIAN CONFLICT, KEYNOTE SPEECH. BELT and ROAD

Respected Senator,

I had the opportunity of attending the launching ceremony for CPECC and listening to your vision and apparently visible views towards helping common citizens through this movement.

Here was this valid question of who should be included as a consensus representative from GB?

I want to draw your attention to the grass-root developments that are taking shape in the region in the form of LSO networks, WORKING ON THE BASIS OF self-help TOWADS A BETTER AND HARMONIOUS FUTURE.

A BRIEF THAT YOU CAN READ ON THIS LINK WILL PROVIDE A PRELIMINARY IDEA ABOUT THIS GRASS-ROOT NETWORK, WHICH YOU MAY INTEGRATE FOR COOPERATION RATHER THAN A SINGLE PERSON OR A SMALL GROUP OF AMBITIOUS PEOPLE.

The link:

http://hisamullahbeg.blogspot.com/2015/02/words-of-wisdom-from-guide.html

To gauge the back ground for this proposal, please recall the targets for each of the LSOs (transposed from those originally given to the mother institution – AKRSP)

1. TARGET ONE: In twenty five-years’ time span, improve the economic conditions so that populations in Northern areas and Chitral can meet the ever increasing costs of health and education and also become SELF SUSTAINING.

2. TARGET TWO. Groom indigenous leadership capable of establishing democracy (pre-requisites for meritocracy, and pluralism) and also capable of planning for a better quality of life for their future without external inputs.

3. TARGET-3: “Facilitate establishment of Knowledge Societies in the program Area” – included in 2003 to the two fundamental goals.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN CHINA'S SINKIANG AND THE CONTIGUOUS AREAS

Source: The American journal of International Law, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Jul., 1963), pp. 713-716 Published by: American Society of International Law

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2196119

Accessed: 06/08/2009 18:34

The red line shows the agreed-upon boundary delineation between Wakhan and the Karakoram Pass as in the outcome of the 1963 bilateral Boundary Agreement

The section given here shows the border alignment east and west of Khunjerab Pass. In the west, the former trade route runs from Hunza via the Kilik and Mintaka Passes towards the Kara Chukur Valley and Tashkurgan. From its western extension to the Oprang Jilga the boundary alignment follows the mountain crest route, while in the eastern section the Oprang and Muztagh Rivers represent the border line.

The riparian boundary is due to the agreement that the Shimshal shepherds were to regain access to their winter pastures north of the subcontinental watershed, which they approached from the Shimshal Pass; see map in Hermann Kreutzmann (2015a: 481) showing the area in question. Source: Survey of Pakistan (1966) 

The Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement triggered the construction of the Karakoram Highway. In order to keep away from controversial international boundaries the hitherto less important Khunjerab Pass (4,655 m) was selected as the crossing-point for connecting both countries with a trans-mountain passage. Snowfall is affecting travel conditions during winters.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-PAKISTAN

AGREEMENT ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN CHINA'S SINKIANG AND THE CONTIGUOUS AREAS ¹

Signed at Peking March 2, 1963; in force March 2, 1963

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan,

Having agreed, with a view to ensuring the prevailing peace and tran­quillity on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and on the basis of Ten Principles as enunciated in the Bandung Conference;

Being convinced that this would not only give full expression to the de­sire of the peoples of China and Pakistan for developing good neighborly and friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace;

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Agreement and appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries, the following:

Marshal Chen Yi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the Government of the People's Republic of China,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs, for the Government of Pakistan,

who, having mutually examined their full powers, found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE ONE

In view of the fact that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, has never been formally delimited, the two Parties agree to de­limit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line, including natural features, and in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit, and friendly cooperation.

ARTICLE Two

I. In accordance with the principle expounded in Article One of the present Agreement, the two Parties have fixed, as follows, the alignment of the entire boundary line between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under the actual control of Pakistan.

(1) Commencing from its northwestern extremity at Height 5630 meters (a peak, the reference co-ordinates of which are approximately Longitude 74° 34' E and Latitude 37° 03' N), the boundary line runs generally east­ward and then southeastward along the main watershed between the tribu­taries of the Tashkurgan River of the Tarim River system on the one hand and the tributaries of the Hunza River of the Indus River system on the other hand, passing through the Kilik Daban (Dawan), the Mintaka Daban (Pass), the Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Kutejilga Daban (named on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik Pass (named on the Pakistan map only), and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass).

(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass), the boundary line runs generally southward along the above mentioned main watershed up to a mountain top south of the Daban (Pass), where it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a south­easterly direction, which is the watershed between the Akjilga River (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan map on the one hand, and the Taghdumbash (Oprang River) and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand. According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of the bed of the Keliman Su to reach its confluence with the Kelechin River. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shakagam or Muztagh River.

(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin River (Shakagam or Muztagh River) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 76° 02' E and Latitude 36° 26' N) with the Sorbulak Daria (Shimshal River or Braldu River).

Shimshal was affected by an unclear border delineation between China and Pakistan; as long as the international boundary was not drawn in a mutually acceptable way, a number of territorial disputes occurred. Only after the Pak-China Boundary agreement of 1963 was the shaded area returned to

Shimshal, guaranteeing people’s access to their inherited pastures. Source: The representation is based on Hermann Kreutzmann (2015a: 481).

(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line, according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram Range main watershed at a mountain­top (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 75° 54' E and Lati­tude 36° 15'N), which on this map is shown as belonging to the Shorbulak Mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line from the confluence of the above mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through Height 6520 meters (21,390 feet) till it joins the Karakoram Range main watershed at a peak (reference co-ordinates approximately Longitude 75° 57' E and Latitude 36° 03' N).

(5) Thence, the boundary line, running generally southward and then eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram Range main watershed which separates the Tarim River drainage system from the Indus River drainage system, passing through the East Mustagh Pass (Muztagh Pass, the top of the Chogri Peak (K2), the top of the Broad Peak, the top of the Gasher­brum Mountain (8068) Indirakoli Pass (named on the Chinese map only) and the top of the Teram Kangri Peak, and reaches its southeastern ex­tremity at the Karakoram Pass.

II. The alignment of the entire boundary line, as described in Section I of this Article, has been drawn on the 1/one million scale map of the Chinese side in Chinese and the 1/one million scale map of the Pakistan side in English, which are signed and attached to the present Agreement.*

III. In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical in their representation of topographical features, the two Parties have agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section I is concerned; and that they will be determined as far as possible by joint survey on the ground.

ARTICLE THREE

The two Parties have agreed that

I. Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river bed shall be the boundary line ; and that

II. Wherever the boundary passes through Daban (Pass), the water­parting line thereof shall be the boundary line.

ARTICLE FOUR

I. The two Parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a Joint Boundary Demarcation Commission. Each side will appoint a Chairman, one or more members and a certain number of Advisers and technical staff. The Joint Boundary Commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with the provisions of the present Agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly

(1) To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated in Article Two of the present Agreement, so as to set up boundary markers at places considered to be appropriate by the two Parties and to delineate the boundary line on the jointly prepared accurate maps.

(2) To draft a Protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get printed detailed maps to be attached to the Protocol with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers shown on them.

II. The aforesaid Protocol, upon being signed by the representatives of the Governments of the two countries, shall become an Annex to the present Agreement, and the detailed maps shall replace the Attached Maps to the present Agreement.

III. Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned Protocol, the tasks of the Joint Commission shall be terminated.

ARTICLE FIVE

The two Parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually ex­isting between the two countries shall be settled peacefully by the two sides through friendly consultations.

ARTICLE Six 

The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will re-open negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China, on the boundary, as described in Article Two of the present Agree­ment, of Kashmir, so as to sign a Boundary Treaty to replace the present Agreement.

Provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of this Agreement and of the aforesaid Protocol shall be maintained in the formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China.

ARTICLE SEVEN 

The Present Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the second day of March 1963, in the Chinese and English language, both texts being equally authentic.

[Signatures omitted.]